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Abstract 
Due to a better understanding of the logical interrelationships between the comparative-
advantage proposition, the classical rule of specialization and the proposition regarding the non-
appliance of the labor theory of value in international exchanges in Ricardo’s famous numerical 
example in the Principles, it is now possible to arrive to a definite conclusion regarding the 
longstanding academic debate about the true author of the comparative-advantage proposition. 
Torrens is not entitled to the same amount of merit as David Ricardo with regard to the 
comparative-advantage proposition since he fell short of formulating a full prove of it prior to 
the publication of Ricardo’s Principles. In the 1815 example of English cloth being traded for 
Polish corn, Torrens missed to apply the classical rule of specialization for Poland. For the 
featured international exchange to take place, though, there has to be gains from trade for both 
trading partners. More importantly, Torrens also failed to recognize the crucial role of Ricardo’s 
insight regarding the non-appliance of the law of value in international exchanges in proving the 
comparative-advantage proposition. Therefore, the bulk of the authorship-merit for this 
proposition rightly belongs to Ricardo. 
 
Keywords: comparative advantage, David Ricardo, Robert Torrens, international trade theory, 
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Introduction 
 In science the credit goes to the man who convinces the world,  
 not to the man to whom the idea first occurs. 
Francis Darwin 
Since the first half of the nineteenth century until the present there has been an ongoing 
debate among economists about the accurate attribution of authorship-merits for the 
comparative-advantage proposition. Resuming the many twists and turns of this long-standing 
controversy, Ruffin (2002, pp. 727-728) critically asserts: 
“Historians of the law of comparative advantage have turned a relatively simple and 
beautiful story into a confused tangle of claims of priority, error, incompleteness, and 
attribution. It has been said that Robert Torrens (1780-1864) deserves the credit for 
discovering the law; James Mill (1773-1836) gave the theory to Ricardo; Ricardo had no 
interest in the law after it appeared; and Ricardo's exposition is deeply incomplete.” 
For the sake of turning the page on this apparently endless academic dispute, some may think 
that it is perhaps better to simply bypass this cumbersome issue altogether. After all, what really 
matters is to grasp the content of the comparative-advantage proposition, right? I respectfully 
disagree with this point of view, since I am convinced that the accurate distribution of merit for 
the formulation of the comparative-advantage proposition is not merely an issue of fairness 
towards its rightful author, but is also an indispensable exercise for further clarifying and 
deepening the understanding of the proposition itself. 
It turned out recently that with the notable exemptions of Sraffa (1930) and Ruffin (2002), all 
the main participants in this longstanding academic dispute had either an incomplete or flatly 
wrong understanding of Ricardo’s famous numerical example of chapter seven of the Principles. 
Given this fact, it seems now perfectly understandable why there has been such a hassle in 
identifying the rightful author of the comparative-advantage proposition. 
Ruffin (2002; 2005) has recently been the most outspoken scholar in favor of granting 
Ricardo the exclusive merit for the comparative-advantage proposition. Along with the 
rediscovering of Sraffa’s correct interpretation of Ricardo’s four numbers, he presents in the first 
paper (2002) some valuable insights about the concrete circumstances and probable date of 
Ricardo’s formulation of the proposition. 
Despite the relevance and accuracy of Ruffin’s insights, the authorship-debate over 
comparative advantage seems to be far from over. In a paper published as recently as 2006, 
Kemp & Osaka suggest again that Ricardo took the comparative-advantage insight from Torrens, 
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calling it the Torrens-Ricardo Principle of Comparative Advantage. This paper may have prompted 
Ruffin to take another shot on the issue. In his second paper on the subject, Ruffin (2005) rejects 
Torrens’ claim of authorship over comparative advantage by affirming that the later was the 
author and main advocate of the so-called absolute cost advantage theory of trade. According to 
Ruffin, this automatically disqualifies Torrens for claiming authorship for comparative advantage, 
since one cannot pretend to be the author of two mutually exclusive propositions at the same 
time. 
The present paper argues that Torrens’ presumed advocacy of the absolute advantage theory 
of trade – even if it turns out to be true – is rather irrelevant for judging his merits with respect 
to the comparative-advantage proposition. A direct and more effective way of rejecting Torrens’ 
claim consists in highlighting the crucial omissions and shortcomings of his enunciation of the 
comparative-advantage proposition in the 1815 pamphlet Essay on the External Corn Trade. 
Two Approaches for Rejecting Torrens' Claim of Authorship 
Ruffin (2005) refers to several passages of the above-mentioned pamphlet in order to 
fundament his assertion that Torrens was the author of the absolute advantage theory of trade. 
As already mentioned, the explicit purpose of attributing this theory to Torrens is to disqualify 
him from claiming authorship for the comparative-advantage proposition.1 In essence, Ruffin 
argues that Torrens’ claim over comparative advantage has to be rejected because of his alleged 
lack of consistency on the subject. This argumentation is based on the presumption that the 
absolute cost advantage theory of trade is the precursor and main alternative to the comparative-
advantage proposition. This presumption, however, has been partially questioned in a previous 
paper (Morales Meoqui, 2010). There I have argued that the absolute cost advantage theory of 
trade does not contradict the comparative-advantage proposition if by absolute cost advantage 
one merely means a nominal or money cost advantage of one country over another. 
Moreover, Ruffin’s line of argumentation is unlikely to persuade those scholars who do not 
share his high appreciation for consistency. They will probably counter that consistency is not an 
indispensable requirement for deserving at least some credit for the formulation of a new 
concept, proposition or theory. In order to be considered as the main author of the comparative-
                                                
1 Ruffin (2005, pp. 711-712) states: “Although Torrens used a phrase that fit the law of comparative 
advantage, he surrounded the phrase with both nonsense (as will be shown) and the main alternative to 
that law. This would seem to be an unlikely basis for claiming that someone discovered the scientific 
theory or law. As has often been said, the hard part of discovering something important is recognizing it.” 
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advantage proposition, it might be perfectly enough if Torrens had formulated an adequate 
demonstration of this proposition prior to the publication of the Principles. 
Taking into consideration the above objections, I believe that the approach of rejecting 
Torrens’ claim by linking him to the absolute cost advantage theory of trade will not resolve the 
longstanding debate in favor of Ricardo. This does not imply by any mean, though, that Torrens’ 
claim of authorship over the comparative-advantage proposition has to be accepted. On the 
contrary, this unsuitable claim can be rejected in a more effective way by indicating rather 
precisely the crucial shortcomings and omissions of his enunciation of the disputed proposition 
in the 1815 pamphlet.  
As can be expected in such a prolonged debate, this alternative approach for rejecting 
Torrens’ claim has been pioneered by other scholars before. One hundred years ago, Jacob 
Hollander (1911) already referred to the incomplete nature of Torrens’s statement. Ruffin (2005) 
briefly mentions Torrens’ omissions as well, but does not offer a detailed analysis of the relevant 
passage.2 The incomplete and inadequate nature of Torrens’ enunciation of the comparative-
advantage proposition in the 1815 pamphlet can be explained in much greater detail here as a 
result of new insights regarding the logical construction of Ricardo’s original demonstration in 
chapter 7 of the Principles. More precisely, there is now a better understanding of the logical 
interrelationships between the comparative-advantage proposition, the classical rule of 
specialization and the proposition regarding the non-appliance of the labor theory of value in 
international exchanges in Ricardo’s original demonstration (Morales Meoqui, 2011). This deeper 
understanding of his famous numerical example sheds a brighter light on the deficiencies of 
Torrens’ enunciation. 
Specifying the Achievement regarding Comparative Advantage 
Before dipping into the analysis of Torrens’ statement, though, it is necessary to unmistakably 
specify what should be considered as the central achievement regarding the comparative-
advantage proposition. After all, any accurate and fair attribution of merit for the formulation of 
a new concept, proposition or theory has to start with a clear definition and delimitation of the 
subject for which somebody should get credit. Without such a precise specification of the 
achievement, any distribution of merit ultimately becomes an arbitrary and disputable exercise.  
                                                
2 Ruffin (2005, p. 717) states: “Torrens’s 1815 assertion neither stated the key assumption of trade theory, 
that factors of production are relatively immobile between countries when compared to goods, nor 
spelled out a comparison of the real costs of production of manufacturing and corn in England and 
Poland. Ricardo correctly laid out all of the costs of producing the amounts of goods traded.” 
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As is generally known, comparative advantage is the proposition that a country might import 
a certain amount of a commodity although it could produce it internally at lower real costs than 
the exporting country. One of the reasons why it has been so difficult to identify the legitimate 
author of this counterintuitive proposition is the fact that it is logically intertwined with other 
important insights of the classical theory of international trade, first and foremost with the 
classical rule of specialization.  
The classical rule of specialization stipulates that it is beneficial for a country to import 
commodities whenever it can obtain them in exchange for exports whose production entails less 
real cost compared to the home-production of the same amount of the imported commodities. 
This rule can also be reformulated in order to highlight the gains in output instead of input-
savings. In that case the classical rule of specialization would stipulate that it is beneficial for a 
country to import commodities whenever it can obtain them in greater quantities at the same 
expense of labor and capital by exporting some other commodity than by producing them at 
home. 
As Jacob Viner (1937, p. 441) correctly points out, the comparative-advantage proposition is 
indeed a logical implication of the classical rule of specialization.3 The task of proving this logical 
implication, though, is not a trivial exercise, as has been demonstrated by the difficulties that 
both James Mill and his son John Stuart Mill encountered when trying to reproduce Ricardo’s 
comparative-advantage proposition.4 These difficulties can be partially attributed to the fact that 
both formulated numerical examples which omitted any reference to another crucial proposition 
in Ricardo’s original demonstration in the Principles, i.e. the non-appliance of the law of value in 
international trade when the factors of production are immobile between countries. Since 
comparative advantage is a corollary of this omitted proposition, it is indeed a rather difficult 
exercise to prove the former without referring to the later. 
Since the classical rule of specialization was already well known and repeatedly used in the 
economic literature before 1815, neither Torrens nor Ricardo is entitled to any particular credit 
for it. Thus, the laurels for the comparative-advantage proposition should go to the economist 
who first came up with a full proof of it – not to the one who merely mentioned it as a possible 
implication of the classical rule of specialization. 
                                                
3 Viner calls the classical rule of specialization the eighteenth-century rule, while other authors refer to it as the 
gains-from-trade proposition. 
4 See James Mill (1826, pp. 119-124) and John Stuart Mill (1963-1991, Vol. III, pp. 587-617; Vol. IV, pp. 
232-261). 
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It is now established beyond doubt that Ricardo published a full prove of the comparative-
advantage proposition in the Principles. Therefore, supporters of Torrens’ claim would have to 
bring up a satisfactory prove of this proposition prior to 1817, the year of publication of this 
book. There is indeed a passage in Torrens’ 1815 Essay on the External Corn Trade in which he 
mentions the possibility that England would import some amount of corn from Poland even if it 
had more fertile lands than the later. Many Torrens’ supporters as well as influential authors on 
history of economic thought like Samuel Hollander (1979, p. 461) have referred to this 
paragraph as the main evidence for the legitimacy of his claim of priority over comparative 
advantage. Furthermore, there can be no dispute about the fact that Torrens had already 
published his essay well before Ricardo arrived to the full prove of the comparative-advantage 
proposition, which Ruffin (2002, pp. 735-743) dates around the first two weeks of October 1816. 
But is this undisputed fact a sufficient reason for establishing the priority of Torrens over 
Ricardo as the legitimate author of the comparative-advantage proposition? It might be, but only 
in case that Torrens’ statement contains a satisfactory proof of the comparative-advantage 
proposition, at least equal if not superior to Ricardo’s formulation in the Principles. So let’s 
analyze in greater detail the relevant passage in the next section. 
Torrens’ Omissions 
Torrens’ claim of authorship regarding comparative advantage is based on the following 
paragraph of his Essay on the External Corn Trade of 1815: 
“If England should have acquired such a degree of skill in manufacturing, that, with any 
given portion of her capital, she could prepare a quantity of cloth, for which the Polish 
cultivator would give a greater quantity of corn, than she [England] could, with the same 
portion of capital, raise from her own soil, then, tracts of her territory, though they should 
be equal, nay, even though they should be superior, to the lands in Poland, will be neglected; 
and a part of her supply of corn will be imported from that country. For, though the capital 
employed in cultivating at home, might bring an excess of profit, over the capital employed 
in cultivating abroad, yet, under the supposition, the capital which should be employed in 
manufacturing, would obtain a still greater excess of profit; and this greater excess of profit 
would determine the direction of our industry” (Torrens, Vol. 2, pp. 264-265). 
He was well aware of the counterintuitive nature of this proposition, since he wrote at the 
beginning of the paragraph: 
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“Let us suppose, that there are, in England, unreclaimed districts, from which corn might 
be raised at as small an expenditure of labour and capital as from the fertile plains of Poland. 
[...] [It] seems natural to conclude, that if industry were left to take its most profitable 
direction, capital would be employed in raising corn at home, rather than in bringing it from 
Poland at an equal prime cost, and at a much greater expense of carriage. But this 
conclusion, however obvious and natural it may, at first sight, appear, might, on a closer 
examination, be found entirely erroneous” (Torrens, Vol. 2, pp. 263-264). 
Does the above paragraph contain a satisfactory prove of the comparative-advantage 
proposition? In order to answer this question in a proper way one has to acknowledge right from 
the beginning that Torrens’ example is built on a different logical construction than Ricardo’s. 
Whereas Torrens compares the amounts of cloth and corn produced with a given quantity of 
capital and labor, Ricardo compares the amounts of laborers working for a year which are 
required for producing some unspecified quantity of cloth and wine traded. So each of them 
applies a different – although equally valid – version of the classical rule of specialization with its 
corresponding way of defining and calculating the gains from trade. In Ricardo’s numerical 
example the gains from trade consist in the respective amounts of labor saved in England and 
Portugal by the exchange; in Torrens’ example the gains from trade consist in the greater amount 
of corn that England is able to obtain with the same amount of resources by importing it from 
Poland rather than producing it at home. 
The acknowledgement of these distinctive logical constructions prevents us from judging 
Torrens’ example through the spectacles of Ricardo’s four magic numbers. Robbins (1958, p. 23) 
appears to have incurred in this error when affirming that Torrens missed to point out the cost 
ratios. If Torrens had used specific numbers in his example, they would have indicated some 
amount of output – not inputs or cost ratios. Therefore, Torrens’s missing element is not the 
comparison of cost ratios but the application of the classical rule of specialization for Poland. 
For the featured international exchange of English cloth for Polish corn to actually take place, it 
has to be of mutual interest for both trading partners. Thus, Torrens should have applied the 
classical rule of specialization not only to England but to Poland as well. 
For further highlighting the incomplete nature of Torrens’ statement of comparative 
advantage, let us represent England’s exchange of a certain amount of cloth for a certain amount 
of Polish corn in a table. Torrens does not specify in the above paragraph the amounts of cloth 
and corn that can be produced in England and Poland with a given quantity of capital and labor, 
so I will use the parameters a, b, c and d to refer to these amounts. 
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Amounts of goods that can be produced with a given 
quantity of capital and labor in the respective countries 
 cloth corn 
England a b 
Poland d c 
Table 1: Torrens’ Example 
Torrens affirms that c > b, i.e. the amount of corn that England imports from Poland in 
exchange for its cloth is higher than the amount of corn that England could have managed to 
produce internally using the same amount of capital and labor currently employed in the 
production of the cloth exported to Poland. He does not indicate, however, whether the costs of 
capital and labor for producing c and d in Poland are the same as for producing a and b in 
England.  
One may think that such an explicit specification of Poland’s factor costs is not necessary, 
since the real costs of production for the amounts of English cloth and Polish corn traded have 
to be equal under the postulates of a real cost theory of value. But if the respective real costs of 
production in Poland and England were indeed the same, and Torrens indicates at the same time 
that c > b, then it would follow that Poland is more productive than England in the production 
of corn. This of course would contradict the whole point that Torrens is trying to make, i.e. that 
England would import corn from Poland despite being more productive in the production of 
this commodity. 
  If, on the contrary, the amounts of capital and labor employed in the production of the cloth 
and corn in the respective countries are not equal, then the English cloth and the Polish corn 
traded would have to have different exchange values under the postulates of a real cost theory of 
value. Since England is assumed to be more productive than Poland in the production of both 
cloth and corn, i.e. a > d and b > c, it follows then that the English commodities would have to 
be produced with less real factor costs and, for the same reason, should also have less exchange 
value than the Polish commodities.  
Nowadays it is rather difficult to assess whether Torrens was aware of the theoretical 
difficulties of offering a complete proof for this counterintuitive but logical implication of the 
classical rule of specialization. What seems clear now is that he simply bypassed these theoretical 
difficulties by skipping the application of the classical rule of specialization for Poland, and thus 
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avoiding any explicit reference to the costs of capital and labor in that country. This explains why 
Torrens has nothing to say about the non-appliance of the law of value in international 
exchanges, which is a crucial proposition in Ricardo’s numerical example. As a consequence, he 
also fails to mention the critical assumption responsible for the non-appliance of the law of value 
in international trade: the inability of labor and capital to move from a country where 
productivity is low to another country with a higher level of productivity.  
For economists who adhere to the neoclassical theory of value, Torrens’ omissions may not 
seem as particularly important. According to the neoclassical theory of value, the real costs for 
the amounts of cloth and corn traded do not determine the relative value of these commodities, 
and therefore do not have to be necessarily equal. Therefore, a neoclassical economist could not 
be held accountable if his or her demonstration of the comparative-advantage proposition would 
have had similar deficiencies. The same kind of indulgence, however, cannot be applied to a 
classical political economist like Torrens. 
In order to be fair one has to admit that many Torrens’ supporters would presumably share 
the assessment that their candidate’s demonstration of the comparative-advantage proposition is 
rather unsatisfactory. Their argumentation in favor of granting him the authorship over Ricardo 
has always rested more on the alleged deficiencies in Ricardo’s demonstration of comparative 
advantage rather than the specific merits of Torrens’ exposition. For this reason, the accurate 
interpretation of Ricardo’s numerical example in the Principles is the equivalence of a knock-out 
punch against Torrens’ claim, since it proves the allegations against Ricardo wrong while further 
highlighting the incomplete nature of Torrens’ demonstration of the comparative-advantage 
proposition.  
In resume, Torrens may deserve some credit for realizing that the comparative-advantage 
proposition is indeed a possible implication of the classical rule of specialization. But since he 
did not offer a satisfactory prove of the proposition, he cannot be considered as its legitimate 
author nor granted precedence over Ricardo, as Samuel Hollander (1979, p. 461) does. It took 
the keener mind of a master logician like Ricardo’s to recognize the subtleties and theoretical 
challenges surrounding the proof of this counterintuitive proposition. As Ruffin (2002, p. 731) 
correctly states: “There is a difference between hinting at a result and providing the tools to prove a theorem.” It 
was Ricardo – not Torrens – who provided the necessary tools for proving the comparative-
advantage proposition. 
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Conclusions 
The comparative-advantage proposition is a logical implication of the classical rule of 
specialization. As such it is highlighted – perhaps for the first time – in a pamphlet written by 
Torrens two years before the publication of the Principles. Although Torrens may deserve some 
credit for being the first to mention this possible implication of the classical rule of specialization, 
he cannot be considered as the legitimate author of the comparative-advantage proposition, 
because he did not offer a satisfactory prove of it.  
Torrens clearly missed to apply the classical rule of specialization for Poland in his 1815 
example of English cloth being traded for Polish corn. For this featured international exchange 
to take place, though, there has to be gains from trade for both trading partners. As a 
consequence of this omission, Torrens failed to recognize the crucial role of the law of value in 
proving the comparative-advantage proposition, since the later is a corollary of the non-
appliance of the law of value in international exchanges. Because of these important omissions, 
Torrens’ authorship-claim over the comparative-advantage proposition can be rejected without 
having to take the rather tortuous and questionable approach of portraying him as the author 
and outspoken advocate of the absolute-advantage theory of trade.  
So Ricardo was indeed the first economist who offered a full and yet ingeniously simple prove 
of the comparative-advantage proposition in the famous numerical example of chapter seven of 
the Principles. Consequently, he rightly deserves the bulk of the authorship-merit – if not the 
whole credit – for this proposition. 
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